An Unrecognizable America
In this extract from a recent Red Passport podcast the focus turned to the war in Ukraine, US foreign policy under Donald Trump, and the shifting global order.
In October, President Zelenskyy conducted a working visit to the United States seeking America's continued support for the war effort. Photo: The Presidential Office of Ukraine.
Many have described the war in Ukraine as a war of attrition; Ukraine’s former foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba has called it a “war of hope.” Both descriptions carry truth. But consider the numbers: after more than a million Russian casualties and fatalities, Moscow has gained only about one percent more territory than it controlled at the outset. It is an almost absurd calculus of devastation.
Three and a half years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we have crossed a grim and revealing milestone. The war has now lasted longer than the Soviet Union’s own Second World War experience – the so-called Great Patriotic War, which cost 26 million Soviet lives. That comparison is not about equating conflicts; it is a reminder of the sheer duration and weight of the present war, and how deeply it has already reshaped the global security landscape.
What stays with me most from those early months is the extraordinary, heroic defence mounted by Ukrainians – how they shattered Moscow’s expectation that Kyiv would fall in days. That moment was marked by a wave of solidarity, blue-and-yellow flags in windows, and a sense that the democratic world was united. But over time, even war becomes normalized, at least for those far away.
For Ukrainians, nothing is normal. “Normal” is sleeping in subway stations. “Normal” is enduring hours-long bombardments of major cities like Kyiv and Kharkiv. Russia is now striking apartment buildings in previously untouched regions of western Ukraine. The country’s GDP has collapsed by roughly 40 percent. Seven to eight million people – mostly mothers and children – have been living abroad for three years. Husbands and fathers remain in the army, exhausted but unwilling to surrender.
Russians, too, are weary. The early war-economy “high” has given way to fatigue, but dissent is impossible. Speaking out risks prison. That is the atmosphere the Kremlin has created.
This geopolitical moment calls to mind Benjamín Labatut’s remarkable novel When We Cease to Understand the World, which traces the limits of human comprehension in the face of disruptive forces. Something similar is happening in global politics. The world of foreign affairs, security, and economic interdependence is being reordered in ways we do not fully understand. And yet we cannot opt out of trying to make sense of it.
The greatest disruptor is Donald Trump. His eccentric, often erratic approach to America’s role in the world has left allies scrambling. The US now seems to view itself as competing with every other country – including partners and traditional allies. The rest of us are left trying to interpret and adapt to this “new America.” As Bob Rae noted recently, the US has become “unrecognizable.”
This is playing out most visibly in the back-channel “peace” initiatives now circulating between Trump envoys – real estate figures like Witkoff and Kushner – and Russian officials. Increasingly, these proposals resemble business deals rather than peace plans. They quietly discard the fundamental reality of Russia’s illegal and criminal invasion of Ukraine. These documents read like Russian drafts. There is no acknowledgement of wrongdoing. European and other allies are consigned by the US to an entirely reactive posture to US-Russia negotiation. We are entering uncharted territory.
What makes this moment particularly difficult is that one of Vladimir Putin’s longstanding aims has been to weaken the alignment between the US and Europe. He could not fully achieve it on his own. Now the US appears increasingly willing to do it for him.
To their credit, European governments have, collectively, contributed more financial assistance to Ukraine’s defence than the US. They, like Ukraine, have spent three years trying to keep Washington aligned and engaged. But when the centre of American foreign policy remains unpredictable, the strain shows.
Meanwhile, Trump-aligned actors are entertaining deals with Kirill Dmitriev, head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund – often described as a multibillion-dollar Putin slush fund. They are exploring new US–Russia ventures in Arctic oil and gas, rare minerals, and other strategic sectors. These discussions appear tailored toward private commercial interests rather than any coherent foreign-policy framework.
Wars almost never end with sweeping grand bargains. They more often end with ceasefires or armistices, leaving the most contentious issues – territory, prisoners, displaced populations, abducted children – to be resolved later, or never. Korea and Cyprus offer painful examples. That kind of imperfect end state is one the world could accept. But Russia does not want the war to end. Putin still believes he is winning.
What emerges from all of this is a world in which old assumptions – about the US, about alliances, about deterrence – no longer hold in predictable ways. Ukrainians desperately want this criminal war against them to end, but will solidly reject the sort of surrender Trump seems to endorse. European democracies, and Canada, must support Ukraine in denying the first negotiated defeat since the Second World War of a European democracy to an outside autocratic invader.
Editor’s note: This piece is adapted from the 2 December 2025 episode of the CIC’s Red Passport podcast, “Rumours of War and Peace in Global Context”. It has been edited for length and clarity.
