Fish Are Dying. Canada Can Help Stop It.

Fish are dying. Almost 36 percent of global fish stocks are overfished, meaning one in three is being harvested beyond sustainable limits. This is an ecological disaster in the making. It is also a looming socioeconomic one. Across Canada, the seafood industry directly and indirectly supports more than $8 billion in GDP and nearly 67,000 jobs in roughly 1,500 coastal and rural communities. Given Canada’s geography, coastal provinces will bear the brunt of the damage. 

In Atlantic Canada alone, the seafood industry accounts for $5.68 billion in GDP and 47,770 jobs. Seafood is also an important source of nutrition: one study found that nearly one-fifth of Canadians consume seafood on any given day, and another found that 87 percent of Canadians eat seafood regularly. All of this is at risk if fish stocks continue to decline—not to mention our moral obligation to safeguard this common heritage for future generations. 

The world’s leaders recognized the urgency in 2015, when the United Nations adopted Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14, devoted to conserving and sustainably using the oceans, seas, and marine resources. Progress since then has been deeply disappointing. In 1974, only 10 percent of assessed fish stocks were below biologically sustainable levels. By 2015, when the UN adopted the SDGs, that figure had risen to more than 31 percent. Today, at almost 36 percent, the trend is still moving in the wrong direction.

Subsidizing to Empty the Ocean

One reason for this decline is that governments at every level still subsidize overcapacity and overfishing. In other words, public money is helping deplete fish stocks—at an estimated US $22.2 billion worldwide. That fiscal absurdity should anger budget-constrained taxpayers everywhere. That is also why target 6 of SDG 14 calls for prohibiting subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, as well as subsidies that support illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. 

The harm does not stop at the treasury. Subsidized IUU fishing and overfishing hollow out the very stocks that coastal economies depend on, so taxpayers pay twice: once to fund the subsidy, and again when fish catches decline, processing plants close, and communities that rely on the fishery, as many in Atlantic Canada, British Columbia, and the North do, are left to absorb the loss. The damage to Canada’s marine biodiversity compounds with every season of overharvest.   

The SDG deadline was 2020. We missed it, but a deal remains within reach. As a country stretching from coast to coast to coast while providing relatively little in subsidies to its fisheries sector, Canada is uniquely placed—and has a clear interest—to help push the negotiations across the finish line.

The Clock is Ticking

The UN tasked the World Trade Organization (WTO) with achieving SDG 14.6 by curbing harmful fisheries subsidies. Although the original 2020 deadline was missed, the WTO adopted the first part of its response at its twelfth Ministerial Conference in 2022: binding disciplines on subsidies for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, fishing overfished stocks, and unregulated high-seas fishing.

Yet entry into force also began the countdown for the WTO to complete the rest of its mandate by prohibiting subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing. Article 12 provides that, if comprehensive disciplines are not adopted within four years of entry into force, the agreement will terminate unless the General Council decides otherwise. WTO members used MC14 in March 2026 to recommit to negotiations and to pursue recommendations for MC15. That makes the next ministerial conference the crucial political deadline for completing the broader disciplines before Article 12’s four-year clock runs out. Given that negotiations have already lasted 25 years, the time is short.

Why Has It Taken 25 Years and Counting?

You would expect governments to act quickly to protect their own resources and finances. Instead, talks about cutting harmful fishing subsidies have lasted 25 years and counting. Why? In short, members cannot agree on which subsidies contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, or on what special and differential treatment should be granted to developing and least-developed countries. 

Some members favour spending caps similar to those used for agricultural subsidies, while others would allow subsidies where robust fisheries management systems can demonstrate they do not contribute to overcapacity or overfishing. Each approach seeks to balance conservation with flexibility, but none has attracted consensus. 

The second issue is special and differential treatment.  SDG 14.6 calls for appropriate and effective flexibility for developing and least-developed countries to be an integral part of the negotiations. The meaning of this phrase has been fiercely debated and is closely intertwined with the broader question of which subsidies contribute to overcapacity and overfishing. Some Members argue that, consistent with the principles of “polluter pays” and “common but differentiated responsibilities,” developing countries and least-developed countries  that contributed little to today’s overfishing problem should face fewer restrictions, particularly because they believe the problem was created primarily by a handful of industrial fishing nations. Others argue that SDG 14.6 establishes the same fundamental obligation for all Members and that special and differential treatment should be limited to measures such as technical assistance or transition periods to help developing countries and least-developed countries implement those obligations.

These two disagreements illustrate the broader institutional challenge facing the negotiations. 

Diagnosis and Remedy

Distrust lies at the heart of the impasse. Members worry that the rules could inadvertently prohibit beneficial subsidies. Some developing and least-developed countries also worry that they will be unable to develop their fisheries industries while industrial fishing nations already did so with the help of unchecked subsidies. But in my view, all countries—and the fish—are on the same team. As our marine biodiversity shrivels, we will face similar losses in our ecosystems and economies. Every member has a self-interest in preventing depletion of fish stocks. Members should therefore trust that others will take their obligations seriously and in good faith, not only out of altruism but also out of self-interest.

Likewise, developing and least-developed countries should worry less that the disciplines will block them from building their fisheries industries through subsidies. Industrial fishing powers such as China and certain European countries already field enough capacity to deplete global fish stocks, and can subsidize on a scale most others cannot match. In other words, a race to industrialize through subsidies is unwinnable. In that sense, preserving sustainable fish stocks through a broad, strict prohibition is the most valuable form of special and differential treatment and the strongest equalizer of the ability to sustain the fisheries industry.

Of course, this still requires a strong agreement. But members have already spent 25 years negotiating, and strong draft texts already exist. Another 25 years of discussion might produce an incrementally better and more agreeable text, but we may not have any fish left by then. With only a few years left to the finish line, time has come to be pragmatic and secure the best agreement available.

A New Deal

So, what might such an agreement look like? That is ultimately for Members to decide, but one useful prototype appears in the latest publicly available draft text. It combines a prohibition approach with a fisheries-management approach, alongside narrow exceptions and compliance-oriented forms of special and differential treatment. Specifically, it prohibits subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing through a non-exhaustive list of particularly harmful subsidies. It also prohibits subsidies contingent on fishing in areas that are inherently difficult to monitor and regulate, making them especially vulnerable to overfishing, e.g., high seas areas. 

Broader special and differential treatment remains available through longer transition periods and technical assistance. 

Simultaneously, it allows Members to demonstrate that an adequate fisheries management system prevents harm, thereby saving the subsidy from the prohibition. The evidentiary standard for this demonstration is higher for developed countries. The same higher standard applies to developing countries that are major fishing nations, while a lower standard applies to other developing countries. Least-developed countries and developing countries with minuscule fisheries sectors are exempt from the discipline altogether, as are their subsidies for small-scale and artisanal fishing. Developing countries may also receive a transition period before the prohibitions take effect.

This is a strong text. It may not be perfect or immune from abuse, but, as noted above, all members share an interest in avoiding that outcome. It includes narrow exemptions (Article B) and, just as importantly, gives smaller developing and least-developed countries a better chance at a level playing field by imposing strict obligations on industrial fishing nations (Article A).

The agreement will also need a credible way to resolve disputes. The WTO’s traditional system was designed largely for reciprocal trade concessions, not for protecting a shared and potentially irreversible resource. With the Appellate Body still paralyzed, members should consider a more cooperative compliance process under the agreement, one that emphasizes transparency, technical review and collective accountability before adversarial litigation. That would better reflect the fact that when one member depletes fish stocks, every member loses.

Canada and the World’s Fish

Canada is well positioned to act as an honest broker in the fisheries subsidies negotiations. It accepted the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies in May 2023, well before the agreement entered into force, and provides relatively modest fisheries subsidies compared with many of the world’s largest fishing nations. That gives Canada diplomatic soft power that can be used to protect fish stocks, marine ecosystems, and the livelihoods of vulnerable coastal communities in Canada. 

Canada should use that credibility to build a coalition around the existing draft: defend strong limits on subsidies that drive overcapacity and overfishing, pair them with transition periods and technical support for developing countries, and keep negotiations focused on the shared conservation objective rather than zero-sum bargaining. If Canada chooses to play that role, it can help turn a nearly finished text into a completed agreement. And that matters, because if the WTO fails again, the cost will not be measured only in diplomatic frustration. It will be measured in declining fish stocks, weaker coastal communities, and further erosion of confidence that multilateral institutions can still solve urgent global problems.