The View from Poland: Russian Imperialism Isn’t Going Away

If there’s one thing to take away from Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine it is the imperial mindset that is deeply engrained in the psyche of Vladimir Putin and the majority of Russia’s elite – an imperial mindset that in-turn is projected onto the lower levels of society. Putin has also made it clear that any resolution to the conflict launched in Ukraine in 2022 must hinge on drastically limiting or completely removing troops from NATO member states along the alliance’s eastern flank – a region of Europe closest to Russia’s borders where allies, like Poland, have dramatically increased their defence spending in hopes of deterring any thoughts of future Russian aggression.

Entertaining Putin’s demands would be a dangerous return to what some call the ‘Moscow factor’ whereby greater focus would be on placating Russia rather than on deepening cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Certainly, allowing Putin to directly or indirectly influence the regional security architecture would set a dangerous precedent.

The Russian Infirmary

Putin’s Russia is like a sick ward where the leading cause of illness is neo-imperialism. The desire for a return to the old Soviet Empire or tsarist times, when Russia was feared and respected as a competitive great power with a sphere of influence extending over half of Europe, is palpable.

Since coming to power in 1999, Putin has relentlessly focused on rebuilding an imperial Russia. One area critical to this has been reinterpreting the past to suite his political needs. Teaching or discussing history has centered on the core notion of a siege mentality whereby Russia has for centuries been under threat of invasion from the East or the West, either conventionally or ideologically, and as a result had to make great sacrifices before ultimately triumphing. Exclusion from geopolitical forums, like the G7, only reinforces this narrative of victimization and isolation.

What arises is the idea of Russia as a ‘great’ state, which explains its imperial prominence in terms of a reactionary phenomenon, rather than an offensive move based on territorial enlargement or political opportunism. Russia has been described as a geopolitically integrated state (for example, the notion that Belarusians or Ukrainians are subnational parts of the Russian nation) with a continuous linear tradition. For Putin, Russia’s history spans uninterrupted from the 9^th to the 21^st centuries, with the Soviet period holding a special spot, especially the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II and subsequently redesigning the postwar European order at Yalta. Highlighting elements of constant external threat helps explain not only the low points of the past, but also helps rally Russians around the flag by mobilizing the masses to support a leader bent on restoring Russia’s greatness and global prominence.

Indeed, instrumentalizing history not only reinforces the imperial past, it also validates Putin’s territorial revisionism. However, a paradox emerges in that revisionism can only be achieved through the use of force since Putin’s model for Russian development is unattractive for the people of Eastern Europe.

Aggression by force also seems to create an odd state of euphoria among Russians. When Russia wages war, leaders are idolized, enemies are loathed and Russians are ready to sacrifice everything. In addition, there is a sense of excitement when part of the world fears or, as they would have it, respects their army and nuclear arsenal. In other words, Russians revel in the violent power of their violent state. Perhaps most alarming is when this ‘conflict high’ ceases, the imperial syndrome is fed with the promise of another episode in the near future.

Russia’s “Dangerous Enemy”

On several occasions, the former chief of staff of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces publicly stated that Poles are not Russophobes, but realists. Poland’s historical understanding and past experience of Russian imperialism, colonialism, and nationalism, led intellectuals and experts to conclude that Russia has a Poland syndrome.

Putin and the Russian elite, for example, have boasted of their desire to nuke Warsaw or to overrun the country militarily in mere minutes. In November 2023, former ‘liberal’ modernizing president turned anti-Western hawk Dmitri Medvedev warned Poland that Russia considers it a dangerous enemy that could lose its statehood. Furthermore, Russia lavishly commemorates every 4 November a popular uprising that ended the Polish occupation of Moscow and the Kremlin in 1612.

This obsession with Poland is rooted in the competition for influence over an area between Poland and Russia that’s home to Belarus and Ukraine – two countries caught in a regional east-west divide on Europe’s periphery. Belarus is firmly within Putin’s orbit, meaning that aside from the Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia possesses a dangerous outpost on Europe and NATO’s eastern border. Since 2014, and even more so since February 2022, Putin has destabilized Ukraine with the goal of making it a failed state – one unattractive to the West. He’s convinced that today’s Ukraine, with a memory of deep distrust toward Russian imperialism, will never be pro-Russian. Dismantling Ukraine’s social structures and destroying its infrastructure are brutal steps aimed at turning it into Russia’s loyal buffer, from which to increase pressure against the West.

In the past, both Poland and Russia have laid claims over Belarus and Ukraine; the historic traces of which can still be seen today in cities, towns or villages throughout both countries. From a Polish perspective, though, this region was more than simply a geopolitical bone of contention and it often defined or dictated Warsaw’s relations with Moscow. Russian dominance equated to Poland being subject either to imperialism or becoming a satellite state while Polish influence meant staving off or pushing as far back as possible Russian imperial ambitions. In other words, this rivalry was always aimed at establishing predominance rather than neighbourly relations.

History aside, Putin now criticizes the West as decaying while claiming to defend Russia against the dangers of the liberal international order. However, Poland’s tremendous success since the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War came as a result of its drive to join the West – solidifying its security and defence in NATO and its economic stability and growth in the European Union. On the other hand, Warsaw also sought to normalize relations with post-Cold War Russia on numerous occasions in the past, avoiding direct regional competition. Poland’s successful transition story therefore, is a powerful counter argument to Putin’s aggressive authoritarianism and a testament to how a former Soviet satellite emerged from Moscow’s shadow. The draw this has for many Belarusians and Ukrainians makes Poland, in the eyes of the Kremlin, a dangerous enemy.

Can imperialism be stopped?

The longstanding belief was that any modus vivendi reached with Russia (be it tsarist, Soviet or post-Soviet) seriously threatened Poland, exposing Warsaw to arrangements potentially made over its (and the region’s) head while effectively placing it at the mercy of its Western allies and the Moscow factor. Putin’s imperialist foreign policy has only convinced Poland and its regional partners that no reset can change Russia’s dangerous trajectory.

The Russian president has done what tsar Peter the Great once foreshadowed when he stated that Russia needs Europe for only a few decades in order to modernize its state and military before turning its back. The result is that Poland and others are now investing heavily in their defence build-up and modernization plans, hoping that this fortress mentality will be enough to deter Putin from pressing his luck any further.

Hinging on the success of this will be engagement from the region’s other European and non-European transatlantic partners, especially Canada and the US. Here, signs seem positive. At the conclusion of the recent NATO Hague summit, President Trump came away with a different view of the Alliance and its members willingness to step up in burden sharing, especially after consensus was reached on increasing the defence spending target to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. For allies like Poland, which have been advocating for this boost across the board, this is important.

The Trump administration has made it clear that US allies must step-up even more to safeguard the collective defence of Europe as America plans to confront its greatest rival China in the Indo-Pacific region. For its part, Canada is firmly committed to its obligation of defending NATO allies in Central and Eastern Europe, and embarking on a historic defence investment and modernization program. This is good news. But any draw down of US forces in Europe, as teased by Washington, will only further wet Putin’s appetite for restoring Russia’s sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe by force while driving a sharp wedge in the fragile transatlantic community. This would not be in Poland’s interests at all.