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Standing up to Russian Imperialism: The Visegrád Group, the Bucharest Nine and the Lublin Triangle

The first to point out Russia’s geopolitical awakening were the countries located in Central and Eastern European – countries long under the shadow of Moscow.

By: /
22 July, 2025
Former US President Joe Biden meets with the leaders of the Bucharest Nine in Warsaw in February 2023.  Photo: POTUS/Wikimedia Commons.
Michalina Szymoniak
By: Michalina Szymoniak
Independent Writer and Researcher

The disintegration of the former USSR in 1991 created a new environment in Central and Eastern Europe that resulted in political and societal instability and prevented a stable sense of place. Indeed, after the collapse of communism, Central and Eastern Europe was left with a distinct narrative from that of the West, which created not only political divisions but also ideological and cultural ones.

More recently, the brutal war of aggression against Ukraine by Russia has broken the post-Cold War security order. The war particularly affects the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe because it directly creates a sense of danger. There are, for example, still unpleasant collective memories of the Soviet past. For these countries, however, the return of Russian imperialism was not a surprise, compared to the West that was shocked by the shake-up of the European security environment because of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. This new geopolitical dynamic raises the question: Is Europe prepared for the challenges posed by a revisionist power like Russia?

In Central and Eastern Europe, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and full-scale invasion in 2022, have both renewed and accelerated the formation of regional initiatives such as the Visegrád Group, the Bucharest Nine (B9), and the Lublin Triangle (L3). These alliances, as explained below, have reinvigorated debate on the role of Central and Eastern European countries as international actors, aspiring to contribute meaningfully to global and regional security, the latter in light of Russia’s recent actions.

The Visegrád Group

After the fall of the communism in 1989, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland had to confront the political, geographic and economic challenges that emerged. Individually, each of them was not powerful enough to deal with these issues so they needed to look for a solution to increase their security and chances for survival. Based on their history and common geopolitical situation the Visegrád 4 was the result (after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the Czech Republic and Slovakia became independent members of the alliance or V4).

The main goal of the V4, after its formation in 1991, was to have its members join the European Union (EU) as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in order to increase the importance of the group in the international arena while also giving them a greater sense of security. Czechia, Poland and Hungary joined NATO on 12 March 1999 and Slovakia joined on 29 March 2004. All four members of the V4  joined the EU  on 1 May 2004.

Today, the V4 has achieved an outstanding level of economic development growing much more quickly than the EU average and becoming an integral part of the EU’s economic well-being. The structure of the group involves a one-year rotational presidency which differs from other organizations because it does not have a stable, permanent organization.

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, however, the V4 has gone through a crisis and cooperation was reduced to a bare minimum due to differences in perceptions over Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Warsaw is one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters while Budapest disapproved of Europe’s involvement in this conflict. Indeed, Poland and Czechia are pro-Ukraine while Slovakia and Hungary have adopted pro-Russia positions. Slovak Prime Minister Fico, for example, has refused to send military help to Ukraine, and Budapest has blocked EU sanctions against Russia. However, they all agree on two aspects: that help to Ukraine should continue and the fact that Russia has violated international law.

According to the 2024 V4 Summit declaration, members did decide to work together on other issues, including migration, energy, agriculture and EU reform. However, the V4, a once united and powerful political alliance, is challenged because of the same issue that brought it together in 1991 – Russia. Eventually, it was surpassed by a new more flexible alliance, the Bucharest 9 (B9) initiative.

The Bucharest 9

Russian activities in the Black and the Baltic Sea over the last decade have sparked concerns in the region, especially for Romania as it concerns the Black Sea and Poland, and the Baltic states, due to Kaliningrad’s location on the Baltic Sea. That said, the B9 countries – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia differ in their perception of the threat posed by Russia. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, for example, are less wary about Russia compared to the others.

The B9 was established in November 2015 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine’s Donbas the year before. The B9 aims to discuss key security issues, enhance their defence capabilities and promote further collaboration with other NATO member states. However, one of the main objectives in 2015 was to ensure the presence of NATO bases in the Central and Eastern European member states. Like the V4, the B9 format is rather informal, with no institutions or organs. It is more like a reunion of heads of states.

As a result of the 2015 NATO Warsaw Summit, a resolution was reached on the enhancement of the military presence on NATO’s Eastern flank, especially in the Baltic region. As a result, in 2017, four multinational battalion sized battlegroups were created in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO established four more multinational battlegroups – one each in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Later, at the 2022 NATO Madrid Summit, it was further agreed that the battalion sized multinational battlegroups would increase to brigade-size and in July 2024, the Canadian-led NATO Multinational Brigade Latvia stood-up, the first to do so.

Since 2022, consultations among the B9 members have intensified. The 2022 NATO Madrid Summit was a pivotal moment in this group’s activity as all B9 members acted in unison and asked for an increased NATO presence in the region because of the war in Ukraine. In 2023, the B9 summit participants also approved Ukraine’s future membership in NATO. Former US President Biden later met leaders of the B9 in Warsaw almost one year after the invasion began, to announce further commitments to strengthen the alliance’s Eastern flank, discuss further support for Kyiv and recognize Poland’s prominent role in helping Ukraine.

Poland was and is a key player in the delivery of humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine and many Poles have opened their homes to those in need. Indeed, Poland has welcomed the greatest number of Ukrainian refugees, compared to other countries, and currently hosts about 1 million Ukrainians.

After 2015, the B9 countries also increased their defence spending, and the Ukrainian conflict was a key factor as to why. Since the conflict in Ukraine began, Poland has taken on a dominant role in European defence and as NATO’s defence spending leader. It now boasts NATO’s third largest army after the US and Turkiye and has increased its defence spending from 2.7 percent of GDP in 2022 to 4.2 percent in 2024 and plans to reach 4.7 percent in 2025. Poland also plans to more than double the size of the army to 500,000 soldiers, including reservists. Other countries including Lithuania (over 4 percent), Latvia (at 3.45 percent), and Estonia (at 3.43 percent) are among the biggest defence spenders by percentage of GDP as well, understandably enough, since all of them share a border with Russia.

At the B9 and Nordic Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania on 2 June 2025 all the participants reaffirmed their financial and military commitment to Ukraine. This included expanding their collective defence capabilities through defence industrial production, increasing defence investment by pushing for 5 percent of GDP for defence spending and strengthening NATO’s Eastern flank, including the provision of more military forces. Lithuania’s goal is to further increase defence spending up to 6% of GDP in 2026.

With the addition of Finland and Sweden as NATO members, deeper strategic cooperation has now extended across Northern and Eastern Europe. The choice of Vilnius as a meeting place was also a strategic sign of NATO unity and particularly important for the Baltic states fearing the resurgence of Russian aggression amid Russian Baltic Sea provocations.

The Lublin Triangle

The Lublin Triangle is a trilateral regional alliance between Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania established in 2020 in Lublin, Poland. This initiative emerged as another new regional cooperation format focused on aligning their foreign policy strategies mainly concerning common security values and interests. This alliance, compared to the other two, has many unifying features, namely a shared history (particularly the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), overlapping economic interests, cultural proximity and a common threat from Russia.

It is important to note that initially Belarus was considered a part of this alliance but it did not join in the end. Both Poland and Lithuania point out to the need to democratize Belarus first and bring it closer to the West. Certainly, the presence of a democratic Belarus would strengthen this regional alliance due to obvious geopolitical reasons and in 2021 the L3 expressed interest in Belarus joining the group. Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that Belarus will  join due to its current leadership and close ties with Russia.

A key role of this alliance is to support Ukraine, including military measures. Lithuania and Poland have also  facilitated the reception of refugees from Ukraine, by providing  them with educational, living, and working opportunities, advocating for tougher Western sanctions against Russia as well as supporting Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO. In addition, they maintain a common stance towards Russia and are committed to further cooperation within this format, which the three presidents expressed in their 2021 joint statement. These countries also cooperate on issues such as the economic situation in the region, energy security and diversification, regional infrastructure projects and defence cooperation.

In particular, the energy sector is a key point on their agenda as all of them aim to diversify supplies and become independent from Russia. The gas interconnection between Lithuania and Poland (GIPL) which was launched in 2022 exemplifies the close relations between Lithuania and Poland. The Harmony Link project, an electricity interconnector between Poland and Lithuania was also recently approved by Lithuania with plans to complete it in 2030. They also agreed on the expansion of significant projects such as “Rail Baltica” a high-speed rail link which will connect the Baltic countries from Estonia to Poland and the completion of the “Via Baltica” international highway, one of the most important transit arteries in Eastern Europe that links Warsaw and Tallinn.

These initiatives also have economic, political and security aspects that help support closer EU economic ties and NATO’s operations. Poland seems to be a leader, which clearly aims to strengthen NATO’s Eastern flank and act as the initiator of cooperation between Ukraine and Lithuania in order to counter Russia’s imperialistic aspirations.

Conclusion

The regional groupings discussed above demonstrate a collective regional awareness of the challenges faced by Central and Eastern European countries. After Russia’s unprovoked attacks on Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, a reassessment of the political, security and economic needs of the Central and Eastern European countries (along with the Baltic states) took place. Initially, it was clear the West had underestimated the Russian threat, and most NATO militaries lacked funding, personnel and various capabilities. It took the combined efforts of the above-mentioned regional groupings to convince NATO, in particular, that the center of European power and security had shifted eastward.

When it comes to collective security, it is crucial to emphasize that NATO needs Central and Eastern European countries as much as they need NATO. Furthermore, after a long period of lethargy, NATO has returned to its original purpose: to defend Europe from Russia. Given the current situation, and continuing Russian provocations, it is very likely that the V4, B9 and the Lublin Triangle groupings will continue to speak with an independent voice within NATO and the EU and play an irreplaceable role in shaping Europe’s response to Russia, now and in the future. Importantly, are a vital amplifying voice for the geopolitical concerns of the region.

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Author’s Acknowledgment:

I dedicate the article to my great-grandfather’s brother, Private Władysław Sochoń, who died during the Battle of Monte Cassino in Italy on 12 May 1944.

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