Nationalist Governments Now in Both: The 2026 Parliamentary Elections in Scotland and Wales

The road to the 2026 elections

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland comprises England, Scotland, Wales (these three being Great Britain), and Northern Ireland – the part that remained in the United Kingdom when the island of Ireland was partitioned in 1921. These four regions are referred to in the United Kingdom as ‘constituent countries’, though they lack the sovereignty associated with the common usage of ‘country’. Northern Ireland is the most distinct region constitutionally, with a parliament from 1921.

In contrast, the three regions of Great Britain lacked any elected regional governments until 1999.  The New Labour government of Tony Blair elected in 1997 pledged to create elected regional parliaments in Scotland and Wales with devolved powers, constitutional changes confirmed by their regional populations in referenda later that year (though only narrowly in Wales). There is no regional parliament in England, and the UK House of Commons legislates for England-specific matters.  Attempts to extend devolution to the various parts of England began in the North East, but this was rejected overwhelmingly by the voters there in a 2004 referendum.

The United Kingdom is not a federal system like Canada, where regional governments exist throughout the country, sovereignty is shared, and powers are delineated constitutionally. Rather it is a system of devolution, where minority regions have their own governments, but whose powers are devolved (transferred) from the centre rather than being delineated constitutionally. Indeed, the United Kingdom does not even have a single written constitution. UK devolution as has existed since 1999 is thus both narrower in geographic scope and not entrenched as compared to federalism (for a schematic contrast of these multilevel political organizations, see Figure 6.3 here). Quite exceptionally, the United Kingdom government did agree to a referendum on Scottish independence which was held in 2014, with the question reviewed by the independent UK Electoral Commission. ‘No’ won this referendum with 55.3 percent to 44.7 percent for ‘Yes’.

The 2026 Elections

Elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Senedd (Parliament) took place on 07 May 2026.  In both regions the outcome was a hung parliament, but with the main regional nationalist party each winning some 45 percent of the seats.  Specifically, in Scotland the incumbent Scottish National Party (SNP) won 58 of the 129 seats, with all the other parties clustered well back:  Scottish Labour and Reform UK Scotland each won 17 seats, the Scottish Greens (also pro-independence) won a record high 15 seats, the Scottish Conservatives only 12 seats, and the Scottish Liberal Democrats 10 seats. This was the fifth straight victory for the SNP.  In contrast, in Wales the result reflected a new two-party dominance:  Plaid Cymru (“Party of Wales”) won 43 of now 96 seats (up from 60) and Reform UK Wales won 34 seats, with Welsh Labour down to nine seats, the Welsh Conservatives seven seats, and the Welsh Liberal Democrats one seat. The Welsh Greens (also pro-independence) entered the Senedd for the first time with two seats.

For both Labour and the Conservatives, these were the lowest seat totals ever in each of these devolved parliaments.  Scottish Labour clearly failed to establish itself as an alternative government (it had led the Scottish government from devolution in 1999 to 2007, when the SNP took over). For its part, Welsh Labour lost full control of the regional government for the first time since said government was established in 1999. Indeed, the Labour Party had been the dominant political force in Wales since the 1922 UK election, indicating the historic nature of the outcome there.  Conversely, the populist Reform UK jumped in both regions, but much more in Wales than in Scotland. This reflects how Brexit still structures British party politics ten years on.  One may remember than Wales voted for Brexit whereas Scotland voted strongly against it, and in 2016 UKIP(the UK Independence Party) won seats in the Welsh Senedd but not the Scottish Parliament.

The rise of Reform UK led to a reaction of anti-Reform voters.  In Scotland, this led to voters sticking with the SNP despite its scandals and flawed government performance, though its total votes did go down. In Wales, Plaid Cymru argued that only it could stop Reform UK, as it did last year in the pivotal Caerphilly by-election for the Senedd. Overall, though, an actual Reform government in Wales was quite unlikely, as it faced strong opposition from most other parties.

Challenges for the Incumbent Governments

In contrast to the 2021 elections, when as incumbent governments they benefitted from their handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, the contexts in 2026 were unfavourable. Both the SNP government in Scotland and the Labour government in Wales had not only accumulated baggage over decades in power but had gone through two leadership changes in the previous term.

In Scotland First Minister Nicola Sturgeon resigned in March 2023 and was replaced by Humza Yousaf. He ended Sturgeon’s power-sharing agreement with the Scottish Greens and was immediately faced with non-confidence motions leading to his resignation. John Swinney became first minister in May 2024. In the July 2024 United Kingdom election, the SNP lost a third of their vote share compared to the 2019 election and saw most of their seats switch to Labour.  However, Swinney was ultimately able to revive the SNP and stabilize its support in the 30s due to a shift to the centre and a more minimalist policy agenda. Conversely, Scottish Labour wound up having to fight for second place, and its leader Anas Sarwar even called on UK Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer to step down given his mistakes.

In Wales First Minister Mark Drakeford resigned at the end of 2023 after serving exactly five years in office (his stated limit). In March 2024 he was replaced by Vaughan Gething, but within a couple months Gething was mired in scandals and cabinet resignations.  Thus, in August 2024 Eluned Morgan became first minister. In contrast to the SNP in Scotland, there would be no stabilization of support for Welsh Labour, just a steady drop into third place, indeed a distant third. The great unpopularity of Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and his refusal to grant any of the requests of First Minister Morgan, fed into this decline. Morgan would lose her own seat in 2026, becoming the first incumbent leader of a government in the UK ever to lose their seat.

Electoral Systems

Scotland and Wales each have used mixed electoral systems with a proportional component, though Wales adopted a new fully proportional system for 2026. In Scotland, the additional member system (AMS) combines single-member constituencies elected by plurality with regional lists allocated proportionally. If the party system is quite multi-party and one of these parties can win a highly disproportionate share of constituency votes with a small absolute vote share, there are definite issues of overall proportionality. In 2026, this reality produced the most disproportionate outcome ever. Reform UK fragmented the unionist vote while the Scottish Greens, running in only six constituencies (of which they did win two for the first time), effectively funnelled the pro-independence vote to the SNP.  Consequently, even with the SNP dropping 9.5 percentage points in the constituency vote (from 47.7 in 2021 to 38.2 percent), it held almost all its constituency seats. Even though the two pro-independence parties won a combined record 73 seats, as emphasized by their leaders, this was on a combined vote share of just 40.5 percent in the constituency vote and 41.2 percent in the regional list vote – far from a majority and clearly down from the almost-majority in 2021.

Wales had also used AMS through 2021, but then adopted closed-list proportional representation, with now 16 districts each electing six members.  However, the low district magnitude of only six and the d’Hondt calculation method meant the system was proportional only for parties winning some ten percent of the constituency vote — a threshold from which Labour had expected to benefit, but which ironically worked against it as it won a seat in only just over half the districts. Voters and media alike treated the election as a binary choice between Plaid Cymru and Reform UK, suggesting the new system was not well understood.

Government Formation

After each election the nationalist party formed a minority government.  Both regions use positive parliamentarianism, that is, there is a formal vote of investiture for the head of government before any cabinet is formed. In Scotland and Wales, this requires the winner to be the nominee who beats all other nominees combined (which may not be with an absolute majority of all deputies if there are abstentions). If no nominee receives a majority of those voting, the lowest-scoring candidate is eliminated, and another round of voting occurs.  In Wales, the vote of investiture occurred on 12 May, and on the first vote Rhun ap Iorwerth became the first-ever Plaid Cymru first minister over the Reform and Conservative nominees with the support of the Welsh Greens but more importantly the abstention of Welsh Labour and the Welsh Liberal Democrats. In Scotland, the vote of investiture occurred on 19 May, and every party leader (or co-leader for the Scottish Greens) was nominated. John Swinney of the SNP was then re-elected as first minister after three rounds of voting.

Comparative Outcomes

Overall, the Welsh election was much more transformational than the Scottish one. There were three specific aspects to this.  Chronologically first, the electoral system was changed in Wales but not Scotland (though as noted the effects here were minimal this time). Second, the vote and seat shifts of key parties were much greater in Wales than in Scotland.  In terms of vote shares, the value of net volatility (the absolute change in vote shares from the previous election summed across all parties and then divided by two) was almost half in Wales – a strikingly high level some three times the norm. In terms of seats in the Welsh Senedd, Welsh Labour and the Welsh Conservatives combined won only one in six seats, whereas previously they had always had a combined majority of seats, and indeed over three-quarters in 2021. And third, as noted the Welsh election produced not just a change in government but a first-time nationalist government.

Constitutional Futures and Lessons for Canada

Both Scotland and Wales are likely to press for more devolved powers and more money, but specifics differ as Scotland has more powers than Wales. Indeed, in Wales the specific policy areas desired to start are railways, justice, and the Crown Estate – areas which Scotland already controls. More existentially, does all this mean independence (referenda)? Well, no.  In Scotland, where the SNP is pushing for a second independence referendum, they have no authority to legislate for this (a reality confirmed by the 2022 UK Supreme Court ruling). Rather, the UK government must approve holding such a referendum. Back in 2012 this was done by Prime Minister David Cameron via the Edinburgh Agreement, which led to the power to legislate for the referendum being transferred to the Scottish Parliament.  Cameron, however, was someone who gambled on referenda. (His time as prime minister also saw a referendum on electoral system change in 2011 and of course the Brexit referendum in 2016.) Since Cameron, there have been no referenda in the United Kingdom. Although nearly half of voters consistently say that they would vote for Scottish independence were a second referendum to be held, internally the SNP has felt for the past decade that it needs a stable 60 percent in favour to go into another referendum campaign. In Wales, Plaid Cymru did not campaign on an independence referendum (unlike in 2021) but wants to “lay the foundations for a future white paper on Welsh independence”. That said, even if there are no independence referenda the issue will remain.

The parallels with Quebec and now Alberta are clear. Indeed, on 19 October 2026, Albertans will vote in a province-wide referendum covering nine questions on immigration policy and constitutional reform, and now a tenth question choosing whether Alberta should remain in Canada or the Government of Alberta should commence a legal process to hold a binding referendum on separation from Canada. Crucially, the question was set by the Alberta government itself, with no independent oversight.  Canada does have the Clarity Act, and separately the question was considered unclear by half of Albertans in a public opinion poll, but in the end the tenth referendum question is going ahead even if Prime Minister Mark Carney is highly critical of it. Additionally, most of the Alberta constitutional questions would require the agreement of multiple provinces or, in some cases, unanimous national consent under Canada’s amending formula. In the presumed event of such agreement not occurring, this is likely to feed back into separatist or at least negative sentiment in Alberta, as with its 2021 referendum to remove equalization payments from the Canadian constitution.  All these questions make the contrast with the UK government’s ability to refuse a regional referendum even more striking. What is in store for Alberta is still unknown. But if the UK and Quebec experiences teach anything, it is that separatist impulses are easier to put on a ballot than to put to rest – at least when there is a major political party committed to them.