Moving to the Right –
The New Government in Japan

In the October 2024 House of Representatives election in Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)–Komeito coalition lost its seat majority. In the July 2025 election for half the seats in the House of Councillors (the upper house) these parties also lost their majority in that chamber. The House of Councillors election was especially bad for the LDP, which fell to an unprecedented 22 percent of the national vote. Indeed, in this election the big gainers were the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), which ran on increasing take–home pay for workers, and two new nationalist–populist parties: the Conservative Party of Japan and Sanseitō. The latter was formed in response to Covid–19 mandates and is opposed to immigration, and more generally ran on putting the “Japanese first”. Sanseitō also has a revisionist, ultra–conservative view of what it calls the Greater East Asian War, seeing it not involving Japanese aggression but rather Japan liberating Asia from the West. Vote shifts from the LDP to these three parties were especially strong amongst younger voters. The resulting back–to–back defeats for the LDP led to the resignation of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba after only a year in office, though he did hang on until October 2025.

The consequent race to lead the LDP involved five candidates, however the main competition was between hardline conservative Sanae Takaichi, making her third attempt to lead the party, and the more moderate conservative Shinjirō Koizumi, making his second attempt. Both of them had stood for the party leadership in 2024, and indeed Takaichi led on the first ballot then only to lose to Ishiba on the run–off. Shinjirō Koizumi is the son of Junichiro Koizumi, who was a generally very popular and successful prime minister from 2001 to 2006. That factor, combined with Shinjirō Koizumi’s youth – at 44, he was not just the youngest candidate but would have been the youngest prime minister since 1885 – and his charisma led to him being called “Japan’s Justin Trudeau”. Japan is a democracy that has stood out in terms of political dynasties and indeed having had multiple prime ministers whose father or grandfather was previously prime minister; Takaichi was quite different – a first–generation politician.

In the end, Takaichi beat Koizumi and now leads the LDP for three main reasons. First, many in the party especially in the broader membership, were looking for someone to win back votes lost to  the populist right. Second, Koizumi divided the moderate conservative vote with Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, who came third in the first ballot of the leadership race. This allowed Takaichi to have the momentum of clearly leading on that ballot, whereas a preferred moderate choice presumably would have led. Third and more debatable, Takaichi continued to be supported and aided behind the scenes by former Prime Minister Taro Aso, who heads the last remaining parliamentary faction in the LDP.

Takaichi thus became the party’s first female leader, but certainly not in any pro–feminist way in terms of her policies – for example, she remains opposed to allowing both members of a married couple to keep their surnames. Rather, in the style of her role model Margaret Thatcher, her coming to power reflected a clear shift to the right in her party. Like Thatcher, Takaichi is traditionalist not populist. Her policy focus has been nationalistic and conservative. Takaichi was also the protégé of Shinzo Abe, who governed from the right–wing side of the LDP and whose second term was transformative for Japan. Once leader, Takaichi – dubbed the “female Abe” – put many Abe people in key positions.

The first consequence of this shift in the LDP was consternation within Komeito, and a few days after Takaichi’s selection as LDP leader Komeito announced that it was ending its coalition with the LDP – something that had existed for most of the time since 1999. Komeito is a centrist party rooted in the Soku Gakkai evangelical Buddhist movement. Policy–wise it is pacifist, welfarist, and anti–corruption – indeed, the party arose in the 1960s out of a Political Federation for Clean Government. These views certainly clashed with the more conservative wing of the LDP, but Komeito always felt that it was acting as a “break” on the LDP becoming too conservative. The choice of Takaichi combined with her rehabilitation of key politicians that had been caught in the funding scandal which has hurt the LDP electorally was all too much for Komeito. This scandal in 2023-24 involved some 85 LDP politicians selling extra tickets to party fundraisers beyond what was reported, with the money (some ¥600 million) put into a slush fund. This ending of the coalition with the LDP could have important consequences in subsequent elections, as there was electoral co–operation between the two parties. On the other hand, the electoral success and thus importance of Komeito is lessening as its membership ages.

More immediately, though, the issue became that of a new government, with the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) – which did not make any significant gains in the upper house election – hoping to push the LDP out of power. That outcome always seemed unlikely, as the other relevant until recently opposition parties are to the right of the centre–left CDP, at least concerning security and foreign policy (Japan’s traditional left-right ideological divide) where the CDP is more pacifist and concerning nuclear power which the CDP opposes. Related to defence and foreign policy matters, and expanding Japan’s international roles is the need for constitutional change, which the CDP also opposes. Nevertheless, discussions on an alternative non-LDP candidate for prime minister occurred. The first of the parties that the CDP needed in this regard is the DPP. As noted, the DPP stressed policies that would lower the effective cost of living. Its leader, Yuichiro Tamaki, clearly hoped to be prime minister. The CDP played into that desire by proposing him as the joint opposition party prime ministerial candidate.

Also necessary for the CDP to remove the LDP however, and harder to entice, was Nippon Ishin no Kai or the Japan Innovation Party (JIP). The JIP was formed as a local Osaka party and by 2016 was national in name even if not in support. Its current elected leader, Hirofumi Yoshimura, is the Governor of Osaka Prefecture. Policy-wise the JIP is fiscally conservative and socially liberal, above all reformist with a political focus on regionalism and decentralization. Though it did have discussions with the CDP and the DPP, the JIP pulled out and quickly thereafter reached a deal with the LDP. A harbinger of their co–operation came earlier this year, when Nippon Ishin broke ranks with the other opposition parties to help pass the government’s budget in return for the adoption of a couple JIP policies. The JIP can be seen as the big winner in the government formation process, as it held its cards close, and patiently waited for offers from each of the CDP and LDP, and then played its hand well with the LDP.

On 21 October the necessary investiture vote was held to pick a prime minister, which in Japan requires an absolute majority on the first ballot; failing this there is a run–off between the top two candidates. In the key lower house vote, Takaichi received 237 of the 465 votes, not just those of the LDP and JIP – which are just shy of a majority between them – but also some independents (three of whom had been kicked out of the JIP in September and now have joined the LDP caucus). The upper house vote went to a run–off which she also won. The opposition parties each voted for their own leaders, thus in the end the CDP did not vote for DPP leader Tamaki.

Though the media speaks of a coalition between the LDP and the JIP, actually in the new government there are no cabinet positions for the JIP, just one JIP MP who is the “Special Advisor to the Prime Minister in charge of Promoting Coalition Agreement Policies”. The LDP did offer several different cabinet and parliamentary secretary posts to the JIP, but these were refused as the party seemingly wants to have more experience in government first. Thus, this is not actually a coalition government but a confidence and supply agreement between the two parties, at least for now. Not only is the cabinet all LDP, it is overwhelmingly male, although Takaichi had spoken of increasing the number of women in her cabinet to “Nordic levels”. In fact, of the 19 ministers there are only three women (Takaichi included). However, one of them is the first female finance minister in Japan.

With her first policy speech to parliament focussing on the economy and security, Prime Minister Takaichi has pledged fiscal expansion and lowering the cost of living by scrapping the provisional gasoline tax surcharge as well as implementing subsidies for electricity and gas during the winter months. Defence spending will be increased so that the two percent of GDP target is reached this fiscal year, two years earlier than had been planned. Key national security documents from 2022 will also be revised next year. Immigration per se received less focus than expected, but there will be tougher rules regarding the behaviour of foreign nationals in Japan. Takaichi has also backed the JIP’s wish to designate a “backup capital” to deconcentrate functions away from Tokyo, as well as a location to be used should a disaster knock out Tokyo. No surprise that for most JIP members such a backup capital should be Osaka and only Osaka, but this is not a nationally-accepted view.

Public reaction to the Takaichi government is quite positive, certainly compared to when her predecessors took over. Some members of each of the LDP and the JIP are apparently hoping for a snap election. Prime Minister Takaichi early on ruled out an immediate election for the lower house, stating that she wished first to focus on the economy. This said, opposition parties are already preparing for a snap election. However, as part of its agreement with the LDP, the JIP insisted on shrinking the size of the lower house by ten percent (due to Japan’s shrinking population), reflecting both its fiscal conservatism and focus on political reform. Negotiations with the opposition parties on the specifics of this change will last through the end of next year. Of course, with the current House of Representatives only being elected last October, no snap election does not mean no early election (before 2028).

Looking forward, Sanae Takaichi is quite likely to last longer as prime minister than her immediate predecessors. Indeed, assuming she wins the next House of Representatives election (at least by improving the performance of the LDP) she could be a relatively longer-lasting prime minister as this goes in Japan. The broader context here is the fundamental bifurcation of Japanese politics since 1955 into two eras, with the change coming in the 1990s with the first defeat of the LDP in 1993 and the resulting electoral system change for the House of Representatives in 1994. In the first era, intra-party competition was so weak that it was seen as only a ‘one-and-a-half-party’ system. However, there was clear inter-party competition between the factions of the LDP, and prime ministers had little power and were reactive. From 1955 to 1993, only one LDP prime minister lasted five or more years (Eisaku Satō) – an indication of prime ministerial weakness and factional strength. In the second era, intra-party competition has been greater, and the internal factions of the LDP weakened and then largely disappeared, and its prime ministers have often been stronger. In this century the LDP has also reflected a clearer ideology of conservatism. Since 1996, two LDP prime ministers have lasted five or more years – Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe – and Abe was the longest-lasting prime minister in Japanese history, and the only former prime minister since 1955 to return to office. His protégé Takaichi has certainly reflected strong conservatism, and as noted may well be in office for a while.