Mediator to Target: Qatar’s Flirtation with Hamas Ends Badly

Israel’s recent and acknowledged attack on Hamas leaders in Doha, its first on Hamas personnel within Qatar, has been criticized by many world leaders, including Prime Minister Carney who called it “an intolerable expansion of violence and an affront to Qatar’s sovereignty.” Elsewhere, Australia and France both condemned the attack while UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer said Isreal’s actions had violated Qatar’s sovereignty and risked further escalation. But such judgements are arguably misguided.

Assessments of the prudence of the attack should be left until its results are clear. For one thing, the latest reports suggest the intended targets were not killed. And, to be sure, the consequences of attacking Qatar were considerable. As critics note, Qatar may well step back from its role as mediator in the war in Gaza, and Israel’s ties with current and potential signatories to the Abraham Accords that normalize relations and reflect cooperation to contain Iran may be strained. Yet the negotiations under Qatari auspices, while producing the release of some hostages, have yet to result in workable terms for a protracted ceasefire, so it is unclear there is a great deal left to damage.

So far, the expressions of Qatari and broader Arab discontent have been limited to support for condemnation by the UN Security Council and General Assembly, the emptiest of symbolic gestures, as well as statements of solidarity at an Arab summit. Some downgrading of diplomatic relations may follow, but the example of Arab responses to Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear program could be a useful indicator. These elicited pro forma condemnations, but, as I found on a trip to Israel last month, extensive military-to-military cooperation discreetly continued with Jordan and some Gulf states. None of Qatar’s Arab neighbours are fond of Hamas, to put it mildly. The Gulf States that signed the Abraham Accords have a shared interest with Israel in containing Iran and a dependency for military security and hardware on the United States (US), which as can be surmised now, are likely to limit any retaliation against Israel.

Opposition to the attack on principle, however, is still harder to justify. Qatar has never been an unambiguous adversary of Hamas and often enabled its atrocities. After Hamas ejected the Palestinian Authority from Gaza and took complete control in 2007, Qatar and Türkiye were the only two states in the region to offer diplomatic support, and Qatar provided substantial amounts of material aid (short of transferring cash) to circumvent Israel’s subsequent blockade. While Qatari officials called this humanitarian assistance to the Gazan population, it was funneled through Hamas, with no conditions attached, and included fuel which Hamas sold for cash. Since Hamas has prioritized the planning and conduct of attacks on Israel over any provision for those it governs, this could never have been other than aid to Hamas. In addition to official assistance, Qatar has been the venue for the financing of terrorism by others. In recent years, under US pressure, it has adopted laws against such activity, but according to the Financial Action Task Force enforcement is lax and prosecutions rare.

Qatar had hosted Hamas leaders in relative luxury for years before 2011, when the Obama administration asked it to host the Hamas political bureau, to establish a channel of indirect communication (a request that took a generous view of the benefits of communication with terrorists). Between 2017 and 2021, Qatar’s Arab neighbours blockaded it in response to its support of Hamas, though this was rooted in regional rivalry and support for competing terrorist proxies, not opposition to terrorism. Foolishly, both the US and the Netanyahu government facilitated the flow of Qatari cash into Gaza between 2018 and 2023, naively believing Hamas was a force for stability, and using it as a foil to the Palestinian Authority.

Yet Qatari assistance to Hamas coincided with the augmentation of the largely underground military infrastructure in Gaza, the creation of a homegrown arms manufacturing capacity, and preparation for the 7 October attacks, with plans formulated by Hamas leaders in the safety of Doha. After 7 October, Qatar declined to condemn the attacks, and blamed Israel alone for the subsequent hostilities in Gaza, and did not even go so far as to place the Hamas leaders in Doha under house arrest. In its role as “mediator” it has implemented diplomatic maneuvers to limit or interrupt Israeli operations on the verge of success, allowing Hamas to regroup, while the successive shaky ceasefires it has brokered have served to draw out the conflict, while international pressure on Israel mounts.

Qatar’s claim to plausibility as a mediator is flimsy at best given the crucial assistance it has given one party to the conflict both before and after 7 October initiated hostilities. Critics note that the most widely accepted legal framework for attacks on non-state actors, the Bethlehem Principles, precludes retaliatory attacks, and Prime Minister Netanyahu defended the strike as a response to recent Hamas actions. But the Principles permit response to imminent or ongoing attack, where the host state is unable or unwilling to act. Hamas has been engaged in ongoing hostilities against Israel since 7 October 2023, and both its recent actions and Israel’s response should be seen in that light. With its ongoing provision of sanctuary to Hamas leaders Qatar remains a de facto belligerent and it should be denied the immunity that is the prerogative of the neutral. Qatar has also provided Hamas with assistance that stops short of risking its US security guarantee and its broader ties with the West. It is neither just nor prudent to allow this devious double game to be played any further.

Even if Hamas is militarily defeated by Israel, it will attempt to reconstitute itself, with greater success if neighbouring states see they can provide a sanctuary in which it can discreetly rearm and plan further atrocities, while facing no consequences. Any hope of ending the destabilizing and murderous role Hamas plays in the region requires that states who would assist or willfully ignore its preparations for future wars know they will be unable to hide behind the shield of a faux neutrality, and that if they do not bring Hamas terrorists to justice themselves, Israel is both willing and capable.