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Japan’s Historic Landslide: Why it Happened and What Takaichi’s Victory Means

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi turned a short, snap election into a personal referendum on her leadership, producing a record landslide victory.

By: /
23 March, 2026
Image Credits: twinsterphoto / iStock
Alan Siaroff
By: Alan Siaroff
Canadian International Council Victoria, and Professor Emeritus at the University of Lethbridge

The election resulted in a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) landslide of 316 seats, winning more seats than any postwar party ever in Japan.  Its main opponent the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) only won 49 seats, less than a third of its pre-election total.  In fact, the Liberal Democrats were entitled to 330 seats, but they won so many constituencies that they shortchanged themselves on the party lists.  Japan’s mixed electoral system combines single-member districts with regional proportional representation lists.  In this parallel system, the party seat calculations in the two parts are totally separate.  In Japan, candidates from a party are allowed to stand in a constituency and also be present on the regional party list, and most candidates do both (though this varies by party).   Losing candidates who meet the ten percent minimum constituency threshold are eligible to be elected in the regional proportional representation bloc; winning constituency candidates cannot win twice, so they are skipped over to the next name on the regional list. The LDP won so many constituencies in four of the eleven regions that it exhausted its available bloc list candidates — forfeiting in total 14 seats it had earned, six of them to the CRA. The record LDP victory, in other words, should have been even larger.

A New Kind of Leader

Sanae Takaichi of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) became prime minister of Japan in October 2025 and proved instantly popular with voters. Her gender, middle-class background, and forceful speaking style stand out in a country where politicians have been overwhelmingly male, traditional, and often have inherited their seats from family members. Takaichi amplifies this popularity, especially with younger voters, with her social media savvy and self-marketing. 

Although she ruled out an immediate election, opposition parties began preparing for one in November. After all, the LDP had only won 191 of the 465 seats in the 2024 House of Representatives (lower house) election. Takaichi’s confidence and supply agreement with the Osaka-based Japan Innovation Party (JIP) and the addition of three independents to the LDP caucus gave her government the barest of majorities in the House of Representatives (233 seats), but it did not control the parliamentary committees.

Come the new year Prime Minister Takaichi indeed decided on a snap election, announcing on 19 January 2026 that this was going to happen on 08 February. Importantly, Japan had not just a snap election but a record-short election. The actual date of dissolution of the House of Representatives was 23 January, making this an official campaign of only twelve days —the allowed minimum in Japan —and an effective campaign period of 16 days from dissolution. 

A Referendum on Takaichi

Having a very short campaign meant limited possibility for opinion shifts or political mistakes. Such a brief campaign was clearly logical, given Takaichi’s strong personal approval from voters – averaging over 70 percent in the exit polls.  Moreover, being much more popular than her party, she personalized the election as a confidence vote in herself, stating she would resign as LDP leader if she lost her majority.  More generally, she stressed more than her predecessors how the election would determine the prime minister: her, or someone else from another party. During the campaign Prime Minister Takaichi would also repeatedly tell audiences that her signature policies had been blocked by committees chaired by the opposition.

The second largest party in parliament up through 2025 was the centre-left Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), founded in 2017 and having its best result in 2024. The CDP’s leader, Yoshihiko Noda, had been prime minister back in 2011-2012.  Rather than facing Takaichi and the LDP head on, Noda sought a broader political alliance. One was quickly cobbled together between the CDP and Komeito, the evangelical Buddhist-backed former allied party of the LDP. The resulting Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) was an electoral alliance not a merger of parties, and only for the lower house. The two parties remain separate in the upper house (the House of Councillors) and in local assemblies. Noda and Komeito leader Tetsuo Saito became co-leaders of the CRA. There were similar co-secretaries-general of the alliance. 

The creation of the CRA clearly was tilted more to Komeito in three ways. First, as noted, the new leadership was a joint one, even though the CDP had six times as many House of Representatives members as Komeito. Second, in terms of candidates Komeito incumbents received higher rankings on the CRA party lists. This was in exchange for their not running in constituency seats, though in 2024 they had only won four of these. Third, the CRA reflected more of Komeito’s policies on defence (that is, their less pacifist but still relatively pacifist position became the CRA one) and nuclear power. Consequently, many former CDP voters were unhappy that the CRA was not so clearly liberal and a third of these would abandon the CRA, making this alliance less than the sum of its parts.

This election was a referendum on Takaichi and not an issue-focussed campaign. Most parties wanted to reduce or pause the consumption tax in some way (for the LDP it is suspending this on food for two years). The key policy differences were on defence and foreign policy, but the world today has made the Japanese, especially younger Japanese, more hawkish not least towards China. Consequently, Noda and Saito’s repeated references to Japan as a “peace-loving nation” came across as quite backwards looking, as were their criticisms of earlier LDP governments.  It was never very clear what the “Reform” in the Centrist Reform Alliance meant, and they were unable to offer a credible alternative to voters.  Moreover, during the formal campaign period there was but one leaders debate, on NHK, and Takaichi backed out of this citing health reasons —a surrogate took her place – yet she still held campaign rallies that day in the one scandal of the campaign.

A Landslide for the LDP: What for the Other Parties?

As for the LDP’s ally JIP, they essentially held their own in the election, winning 36 seats compared to 38 in 2024.  This was not a given in that there was no electoral alliance between the two, meaning that as noted the LDP ran constituency candidates everywhere, including the JIP’s base of Osaka. In the end only a couple of constituencies shifted between these two parties.  The JIP continues to be a regional party, with its hopes of becoming a pan-national player receding. The bigger story really in 2026 was how between them the LDP and the JIP swept the constituency seats, winning 269 of the 289 of these.

The flip side of the election outcome was the widespread disaster for the CRA, which only won seven constituency seats compared to 108 for its constituent parts (essentially the CDP here) in 2024.  Of the 80 constituency seats in greater Tokyo the CRA won all of one (that of Yoshihiko Noda), the LDP 79.  The CRA lost its regional strongholds of Hokkaido, Aichi, and Nagano to the LDP.  Many senior ex-CDP members were defeated.  In contrast, all 28 Komeito-affiliated candidates won, given that as noted they ran only on the regional party lists and were high on these.  Noda admitted in defeat that he and Saito “looked like an outdated duo”.  Both co-leaders quickly resigned after the election, and a single new leader was chosen, Junya Ogawa. Ogawa is formerly of the CDP and one of the seven constituency seat winners (as was his opponent in the leadership race).

As for other parties, the urban worker-oriented Democratic Party for the People (DPP) held its own in terms of seats with 28, the same as in 2024 (though it hoped to get an ambitious 51 seats).  Actual winners in the sense of gaining more party list seats compared to 2024 were the nationalist-populist Sanseitō and Team Mirai (“Team Future”). Team Mirai, a newer party focussed on digital democracy (technological institutional reform) and the expanded use of AI won eleven seats, appealing significantly to younger and independent voters.

The New Government and the Return of LDP Dominance

Takaichi was invested again as prime minister on 18 February, defeating Ogawa in the lower house by 354 votes to 50.  In the upper house she defeated him on a runoff vote, 125 to 65.  Her cabinet remained the same as before the election. She once again offered the JIP a cabinet position (during a future cabinet reshuffle presumably later this year), and this time the JIP accepted.  The decisiveness of the election result appears to have been what pushed the JIP to accept Takaichi’s request, and the sharing of responsibility this involves, after the party had declined it for months. A governing coalition is seen by Takaichi as a necessary strengthening of the JIP’s commitment to the LDP.

Amongst Prime Minister Takaichi’s many policy goals, the immediate ones are passing the budget, creating a National Intelligence Bureau, and revision of the three national security documents.  Indeed, many of her goals involve security and defence matters that a decade ago would have been all but unattainable.  Japan, a G7 member and still the world’s fourth largest economy, is a key trading partner of Canada and Canada is now a partner for Japan’s economic security. Takaichi’s focus on sectoral investments, technology, and defence will open areas for co-operation and building more resilient supply chains, and this has already started for critical minerals and energy resources.

The LDP by itself now is well above the thresholds to have a lower house majority, to have all the lower house committee chairs (261 seats), and to have a majority on all committees (290 seats), as well as having the two-thirds majority required to override an upper house veto – the first time the LDP has ever achieved this.  (The LDP and the JIP together are still a minority in the upper house, but with the DPP there would be a simple majority in that chamber.)  The only thing the Takaichi government cannot do by itself is change the constitution as that requires a two-thirds vote in each house (followed by a national referendum). Takaichi though is not being as ‘winner-take-all’ in terms of policy changes, stressing how she wants to work with other parties (especially the DPP) and not just ram everything through with her supermajority. The LDP has also offered the opposition one of the 17 lower house standing committee chairs and one special committee chair.

The opposition itself is both ideologically and strategically divided. The DPP, Sanseitō, and Team Mirai have been called the “new third bloc”, separate from both the LDP and the CRA.  Rather than the traditional, confrontation-oriented opposition of the CRA (and the CDP before it), this bloc focuses more on policies and is willing to co-operate with the LDP when there are shared priorities.  The DPP and Team Mirai both helped pass the supplementary budget in December 2025 before the election, for example.  Co-operation with these “new third bloc” smaller parties could also give the LDP and JIP the numbers needed to achieve constitutional reform (Japan’s 1947 Constitution has never been amended). 

Two Japans, One Dominant Party

As Tobias Harris argues, Japan now has dual political systems, with one set of nationally-oriented parties competing for younger, often independent, voters – the DPP, Sanseitō, and now Team Mirai —and another set of such parties competing for older voters – the Japanese Communist Party and now the CRA. These differing cohorts also differ on media consumption (social media versus traditional media), something not unique to Japan of course.  The LDP is the only party capable of competing in each system and thus spanning the two systems.  Of course, in both the 2024 lower house and the 2025 upper house elections the LDP lost badly with younger voters, so it is important to stress that it is the Takaichi LDP which has support in both age groups (as did the LDP under her mentor, Shinzo Abe).  As such, Prime Minister Takaichi does seem set to govern for many years.

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