In Japan, the dominant party hangs on to power

A snap election for Japan’s lower house (the House of Representatives) held on 27 October went against the government, costing it its majority. However, unlike in other democracies this year there was no resulting change of government and thus the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) continues to stand out as the quasi-permanent ruling party. The survival of new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba himself is much more in question, however.

The LDP was formed in 1955 as a merger of two conservative parties, and since then has governed continuously (though at times heading a coalition) with only two short periods of interruption. The party has always been factionalized and is now on its 25th prime minister since 1955.  Historically the LDP’s single-party predominance was due to a combination of Japan’s striking economic success (until the 1980s), the weakness or at least the extremism of the main opposition Socialist Party (also until the 1980s), and less than perfectly fair elections (including even bribery and voter intimidation early on, as McElwain and Yoshikawa recently noted in their book chapter, “Japan: Manipulating (on) the Margins”).  Given these factors, their repeated corruption scandals did not push them out of power until 1993, when various reformist LDP deputies broke away to form two new parties. Since 2012, the LDP have governed with Komeito, a party based on a Buddhist sect.

LDP prime ministers have varied in effectiveness, with the weaker of these having limited periods in power.  Of the recent prime ministers, Shinzo Abe (2006-2007 and 2012-2020, thus Japan’s longest-serving prime minister) was both dominant and a nationalist conservative, increasing the ability of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces to act internationally and limiting press freedom (where Japan is still the lowest of the G7 countries) via direct interference and intimidation.  Abe resigned for health reasons and was succeeded by Yoshihide Suga, who in turn was replaced by Fumio Kishida for the 2021 election. However, by 2024 the return of inflation and fresh corruption scandals, specifically LDP MPs skimming off slush funds by selling tickets to party events beyond the member’s quota and then pocketing and not reporting the surplus, led to record low approval ratings for the party. Consequently, Kishida stepped down in 2024.  

The race to succeed him saw reformist maverick Shigeru Ishiba (making his fifth attempt to become leader) defeat a hardline candidate on the run-off vote. Ishiba has favoured social reforms such as not requiring married women to take their husband’s name and the possibility of same-sex marriage. Right after becoming prime minister Ishiba announced plans for an election, before the multi-party opposition could fully coalesce (they could not always agree on one candidate in each single-member district).  However, the new cabinet was very traditional, Ishiba backtracked on his reforms, and the LDP was found to be channeling funds indirectly to those disgraced candidates whom it had not endorsed (most of the disgraced candidates had still been endorsed).  In short, Ishiba seemed to be co-opted by the party hardliners.

Consequently, given the funding scandals, the LDP (which itself had a majority up through 2021), lost 68 of its seats, falling to 191 out of 465. For its part, Komeito lost a quarter of its seats (including that of its leader). Japan thus shares the reality of voter swings against the incumbents that have occurred in every democracy this year. The main opposition centre-left Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) gained 52 seats to reach 148. The other main winner was the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), which wants to raise the threshold for paying income tax and stressed issues popular with youth such as free education (and was the most popular party with voters in their 20s).

Moreover, traditional aspects of Japan’s elections did not help the LDP as much this time. The first of these is malapportionment, with rural Japan (which supports the LDP) traditionally overrepresented, to the point where courts have said the results are unconstitutional. Before the 2024 election though, a redistribution occurred which added ten urban seats and removed ten rural ones. Of the ten rural seats eliminated, eight were in strongly LDP areas. The second contextual aspect is the truly short election period in Japan. This is only 12 days (this having been repeatedly shorted in the past), with no campaigning allowed beforehand. Such a short period – almost as short as the nine-day campaigns in the electoral autocracy of Singapore – favours incumbents over unknown challengers, and limits opposition party effectiveness on economic issues. However, even in these short campaigns, corruption matters will still get through to Japanese voters.

All that said, Japanese voters sought to punish the LDP more than to actually change the government. This relates to the lack of trust in the opposition to govern, at least at the national level. Neither period of opposition rule left a positive impression. After the aforementioned 1993 election, the resulting government involved no less than seven parties. It was able to push through political reforms, especially changing the electoral system to eliminate candidates of the same party competing with each other (which fed into corruption), but then the various parties split over tax and defence policies. Thus, after a year the LDP returned to government by striking a deal with the Socialists in which the latter obtained the prime ministership. By 1996, the LDP regained the prime ministership as well. Then in 2009, with not just scandal but record-high unemployment, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a majority by itself.  

This DPJ-led government was certainly more coherent than that of 1993, but it was unfortunately in power when the 2011 earthquake and resulting Fukushima nuclear accident happened, about which its communication was extremely poor. It also chose to double the sales tax to stabilize the budget, which was obviously unpopular politically and consequently the LDP returned to power in a landslide in 2012. Finally, one can note that whereas the 2009 election saw a spike in voter turnout – a factor often occurring in ‘change’ elections – there was no such increase in 2024. Instead, some traditional LDP voters just stayed home.

Though there was some discussion of broadening the coalition, the relevant opposition parties were not interested; in the end the LDP and Komeito formed a two-party minority government.  This outcome was facilitated by the investiture rules for a prime minister in Japan, which requires a majority on the first ballot, and failing that a run-off plurality vote between the top two candidates.  In the voting held on 11 November, the opposition showed a complete lack of unity with no less than eight opposition party leaders challenging Ishiba to become prime minister on the first ballot.  In contrast, Komeito voted with the LDP. Thus, on the first ballot Ishiba received 221 votes to 151 for CDP leader Yoshihiko Noda, a former opposition prime minister.  The rest went to smaller party leaders.  In the run-off plurality vote (the first needed since 1994), these smaller parties almost all abstained, so that Ishiba held on with 221 votes again and Noda only increased to 160. Consequently, the LDP remains in power.

However, this minority government will be focussed more on survival, and thus quite unlikely to deal with Japan’s longstanding problems of economic stagnation and demographic crisis. To get a budget approved, the most likely scenario is a deal with the fourth-placed DPP, for which the price is an expensive raising of the threshold at which income tax kicks in.  More generally, for the first time in three decades an opposition member will chair the powerful budget committee of the lower house.  

As for Ishiba himself, there is no certainty that he will last as prime minister, and in addition to potentially losing a non-confidence vote at some point he could be pushed out by his own party.  Next July there will be elections for half of Japan’s upper house (the House of Councillors), in which the coalition still has a majority, and if support for the government does not improve it would not be stunning if the LDP replaces Ishiba for that election. The combination of LDP dominance with a weak prime minister may seem paradoxical but it is the general reality in Japan, as opposition governments and strong, lasting LDP prime ministers have each been exceptional.