Close the Gap in the North:
Why the United States and Canada Must Clarify the Northwest Passage now
Legal uncertainty over the status of the Northwest Passage is a strategic vulnerability – unless allies close ranks.
Popular Northwest Passage routes shown in red. Photo: NASA.
Even as Washington and Ottawa spar over tariffs and trade – witness the recent Trump–Carney tariff spat – a far more consequential issue looms in the far north. As Arctic ice recedes, the Northwest Passage – the sea route through Canada’s Arctic archipelago – is emerging as a strategic flashpoint between Washington and Ottawa. Long choked by ice, these channels are increasingly open in summer, drawing commercial interest – and exposing a legal rift between the United States (US) and Canada. Ottawa insists the Passage is internal waters under Canadian sovereignty, whereas Washington views it as an international strait open to free passage. This unresolved dispute, long dormant, now looms large in a warming Arctic. If the two closest North American allies can’t agree on rules in their melting backyard, others are poised to define them instead.
Melting ice, rising stakes
Temperatures are rising in the Arctic, and so are the stakes. Scientists project that by the 2030s, even ordinary ships might be able to sail through parts of the Arctic in the summer without icebreaker escorts, and by mid-century a navigable season of several months could open.
Shipping traffic is still sparse but rising quickly. In 2023, roughly two dozen ships transited the Passage – an all-time high – and 2024 saw a similar surge. Only a few dozen vessels in total have ever made this journey, but each year sets a new record. Meanwhile, the Arctic holds immense wealth: massive untapped oil, gas, and mineral resources worth trillions of dollars. The lure of shorter trade routes and resource riches has kicked off a global scramble. Russia has invested heavily along the Northern Sea Route – the Arctic corridor hugging its Siberian coast – refurbishing bases, stationing S-400 long-range air defence missile systems, expanding deep-water ports and operating the world’s largest fleet of nuclear icebreakers. In one sense, this is unsurprising: just as Ottawa and Washington are pouring billions into Arctic surveillance and modernization, Moscow is fortifying what it views as its northern artery. But defensive logic and strategic ambition are not mutually exclusive. Russia’s scale of buildup signals a bid to shape – and eventually regulate – Arctic shipping on its terms. China has also declared itself a “near-Arctic state” eyeing a “Polar Silk Road.” Its icebreakers are venturing north; in 2025 the US Coast Guard shadowed two Chinese research vessels working legally in international waters just beyond Alaska – permissible under maritime law, but strategically calculated. Mapping the seabed there is not merely scientific curiosity; it is laying groundwork, gathering data, and testing how close Beijing can get without resistance.
Allies at odds over Arctic rules
Despite being close allies, Washington and Ottawa have never resolved their Northwest Passage disagreement – and that ambiguity is becoming dangerous. Canadian experts warn that if security falters, legal sovereignty means little.
This dispute is decades old, flaring in 1969 and again in 1985, when US ships navigated the Passage without Canada’s permission. Ottawa responded by asserting the channels as internal waters, while Washington maintained they were international. In 1988 the countries struck a pragmatic truce: the US agreed its icebreakers would ask Canada’s consent before using the Passage (and Canada would grant access), all “without prejudice” to the legal positions of either side. That compromise kept tensions at bay during the late 20th century, when the Arctic stayed frozen and out of the spotlight.
Today, that old arrangement looks dangerously outdated. The Northwest Passage is no longer an ice-locked afterthought; it’s a potential strategic corridor. The legal fog around it isn’t a minor technicality – it’s a possible opening for gray-zone mischief, the kind of incremental, ambiguous incursions that fall short of war. The Arctic’s vast, thinly patrolled expanse is prime ground for such moves. Russian forces have conducted major naval and submarine drills in the Bering Sea and Chukchi Sea – waters proximate to Alaska – most recently in 2020 and again during a 2022 Arctic exercise. That historical pattern underscores that Moscow has long viewed the region as part of its strategic northern flank. What remains uncertain, however, is whether Russia’s focus on Ukraine has materially degraded its Arctic posture – though Moscow continues to publicly affirm the Arctic’s centrality to its security ambitions and Chinese ships have probed Arctic waters under the guise of science.
Moves by Chinese vessels are also calculated to test North America’s resolve without sparking open conflict – the same way U.S. and Canadian patrols signal presence to assert stability in the region. The difference is not that signaling occurs, but who benefits from strategic ambiguity. When adversaries probe, uncertainty works in their favour; when allies operate, clarity is the deterrent. The gambit exploits uncertainty: if a suspicious vessel entered the Passage tomorrow, would the two allies respond with one voice or get bogged down in legal debate?
As things stand, this legal divide hampers cooperation. Canada, eager to bolster its claim, is uneasy with too much US military presence in what it sees as its waters. The US, defending navigation freedoms, bristles at any hint of Canada closing the door. The result is limbo: if an unknown vessel appears, who has authority to act? In a crisis, such confusion could be deadly. Even the perception of division gives adversaries an opening. Ambiguity signals a weak link.
Closing the gap: A joint security charter
It’s time for Washington and Ottawa to shore up their own house. The solution lies not in one side capitulating to the other’s legal stance, but in forging a new framework that transcends the old sovereignty-versus-transit debate. Washington and Ottawa should negotiate an updated Northwest Passage Security Charter that explicitly marries Canadian sovereignty with joint strategic management of the waterway. Key elements could include:
- Shared stewardship and access: Forge an arrangement that marries Canada’s sovereignty claims with predictable navigation rights for the US and its allies – not by forcing a final legal ruling now, but by creating rules that work in our favour before circumstances dictate them, much as other powers manage unresolved straits elsewhere. In effect, the US would respect Canada’s role as primary steward of the Passage and Canada would commit not to impede peaceful US or allied transit. In practice, Canada could enforce strict but reasonable rules on all vessels – requiring prior notification, pilots, environmental safeguards, etc. – with US support. The US would accept these measures and refrain from legal challenges, as long as the waterway remains open to legitimate international traffic.
- Joint surveillance and patrols: Create a modernized Arctic command architecture – built on NORAD’s 2006 maritime warning foundation but expanded into a joint operational hub for the Northwest Passage, with shared tasking, fused surveillance, and a standing presence that can respond rather than just detect. Existing U.S.–Canada surveillance links — and the likely informal coordination of Arctic patrols — should be expanded and formalized into a fully fused, real-time security framework for the Northwest Passage, one that delivers continuous maritime visibility and a jointly managed patrol rotation ensuring that an ice-capable vessel is always on station throughout the navigable season. Clear joint protocols would ensure any intrusion or emergency triggers a prompt, unified response. To this end, Canada is already investing billions to modernize NORAD’s Arctic radar and early-warning systems; extending that cooperation to the maritime domain is a logical next step.
- Indigenous partnership: Permanent Inuit settlements along or near the Northwest Passage are few and relatively distant from one another – especially in the central and western corridors. On the eastern side, near Lancaster Sound / Tallurutiup Imanga, communities include Pond Inlet (Mittimatalik), Arctic Bay (Ikpiarjuk), and Resolute Bay (Qausuittuq). But as one moves westward toward Viscount Melville Sound and the deeper channels of the Passage – across Victoria Island, Prince of Wales Island, and the Queen Elizabeth Islands – the vast majority of those waterways lie far from any permanent community or Inuit settlement. Because of the sparse population, using Indigenous communities as eyes and ears is useful in the eastern sector, but becomes more challenging (and less reliable) across much of the Passage’s west-central corridor. That uneven distribution underscores precisely why a formal, binational surveillance and patrol framework – not just reliance on scattered communities – is crucial if the Northwest Passage is to be defended and managed properly. In the end, local observation and Ranger patrols, which feed into a surveillance network, will help enforce rules. An Indigenous advisory council would also ensure that policies respect their rights and wisdom. Canada’s Arctic framework says a resilient North includes Northern peoples.
Finally, Ottawa and Washington should leverage – and not merely participate in – multilateral Arctic structures such as the Arctic Council, where seven of eight members are NATO states, to shape norms rather than react to them. The emerging US–Finland ICE Pact illustrates how allied capability can scale rapidly when interests converge. A more ambitious step would be for Canada to push for an Arctic operational framework that links such initiatives – shipbuilding, surveillance, environmental standards, and emergency response – into a coordinated security architecture. Alignment with Nordic partners should not just harmonize shipping lanes, but set the rules by which they are navigated. This alignment isn’t zero-sum – it’s a win-win for both countries’ continental defence. Canada would assert its Arctic sovereignty through action with US backing, and the US would gain a reliable ally to secure a key chokepoint. Together they would send a powerful deterrent signal by closing ranks.
As is well-known, ice in the Arctic is melting faster than diplomacy is moving. Arctic security can no longer rest on old ambiguities. If Washington and Ottawa fail to tighten the seams of the Northwest Passage now, the status quo simply will not hold under growing traffic and outside pressure. Gray-zone challengers are already testing the waters, and they will push further if the Passage stays in legal limbo. The next provocation might not be dramatic; it could come quietly – an unchallenged “innocent” transit – acceptable under US doctrine, but corrosive to Canada’s internal-waters claim if repeated without Canadian consent – or creeping normalization of foreign presence. The surest way to prevent that is to remove any doubt. When allies clearly settle the boundaries of their cooperation in the Arctic, adversaries are kept at bay. A united Arctic strategy would turn the Northwest Passage from a weak link into a source of strength in North America’s defence. Even as tariffs and trade tiffs dominate the news, Washington and Ottawa can look past those frictions and stand together where it counts: safeguarding the gateway to the Arctic – not as rivals in interpretation, but as partners in purpose.
