Chinese-Russian Cultural Diplomacy: Diplomatic Bridge or Diplomatic Façade?

On 4 February 2022, just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China and Russia announced their now-infamous “no limits” partnership in which both, ironically, opposed “the return of international relations to the state of confrontation between major powers, when the weak fall prey to the strong.” The declaration was reaffirmed in February 2025.

A special report by the US-based Council on Foreign Relations in December 2024 examined this partnership in depth, detailing its dimensions across diplomacy, the military, and the economy. The report underscored both the breadth and depth of bilateral ties, emphasizing “the scale and momentum of their strategic cooperation.” Its authors described the reality of “a formidable partnership bordering on alliance, bound together by resistance to what they view as a US-led, anachronistic international order, one that does not permit either country its rightful place despite their power, history, domestic legitimacy, civilizational triumphs, and vital regional interests.”

However, the report did not explore another, often overlooked, dimension of Chinese-Russian collaboration: the cultural realm, and specifically the role of cultural diplomacy. This is currently being expressed through “Years of Chinese and Russian Culture” celebrations that began in early 2024 and have continued this year in both countries. Proclaimed through government sources and papers, the year was announced in May 2024 with the aim to deepen ties between the two societies and to commemorate the 75^th anniversary of diplomatic relations. Indeed, “over 230 cultural and artistic activities for 51 cities in China and 38 cities in Russia” were planned, according to the Global Times. These events range from joint orchestral concerts and exhibitions to a Chinese New Year festival in Moscow and the Russian winter festival, Maslenitsa, celebrated in two Chinese cities. Additional programming focused, or will focus on, film screenings and festival participation, sports competitions, and language contests. In short: “pancakes and dancing,” as the South China Morning Post quipped given that Maslenitsa, often translated as “pancake week,” has ‘blini’ or pancakes on the menu.

In a 2024 interview with Xinhua, President Putin noted that “Russia and China have been inextricably linked for centuries, both by an extensive common border and by close cultural and people-to-people ties.” Citing his personal interest in Chinese martial arts and philosophy, Putin provided various proof points for increasing societal closeness ranging from the growing number of Russian students learning Chinese, to the popularity of Chinese exhibitions and performances in Russia, and vice versa. He further emphasized the shared cultural outlook of both countries, stating that both respected the principles of multiculturalism and the importance of preserving their national identity. For its part, the Global Times views this year of culture as evidence of “the enduring popular foundation of the traditional friendship between China and Russia,” arguing that the basis of bilateral relations lies in “mutual affinity between the peoples, which stems from mutual understanding.”

For students of cultural diplomacy, this is a familiar narrative. In his 1994 essay Selling Nations: International Exhibitions and Cultural Diplomacy, Brian Wallis, writing in the context of a Mexican cultural festival in the US, noted that “to use multicomponent cultural festivals as a form of cultural diplomacy or, to put it crudely, public relations, is the latest development in a long history of propagandistic deployment of art exhibitions. The festival concept only signals a more aggressive assertion of nationalism and greater inclination to manipulate the manifold powers of the culture industry.”

To be fair, the latest cultural exchange between Russia and China did not begin in 2024; this is, in fact, the ninth iteration of such an initiative. Many other countries have held similar exchanges – cultural spectacles within a “year of culture” framework have become a fixture in cultural diplomacy. A case in point: alongside the Russian-Chinese cultural year, France and China marked 60 years of diplomatic ties with their own “China-France Year of Culture and Tourism” in 2024.

What gives the current Russia-China cultural year particular resonance is the way Putin has characterized  bilateral relations as having “now reached the highest level in history and [acquiring]  the character of genuine comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction.” Despite such rhetoric, and the undeniably close diplomatic, military, and economic ties the two countries have, the question remains: how deep do their cultural connections truly go? How interwoven are the two societies, and to what extent do these ties bind them beyond elite-level cooperation? Indeed, Russia has become increasingly dependent on China since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In a recent overview of Russian-Chinese cultural relations, scholar Xu Yuanhong noted that mutual familiarity has remained limited since the fall of the USSR. This limited understanding, compounded by persistent Russian prejudice toward China, leaves the relationship on a somewhat shaky foundation. Xu, however, argues that cultural cooperation does offer a path toward greater mutual understanding. Then again, while cultural diplomacy is generally characterized by mutuality and reciprocity, Xu finds that this is mostly evident in official, state-level interactions. In more informal “popular and commercial” exchanges, there is a noticeable imbalance: for instance, far more Russian cultural groups perform in China than the reverse, a disparity rooted partly in differing market demands.

Moreover, cultural collaborations have traditionally been concentrated in a few major cities and centred on performances and exhibitions, rather than extending to regional areas or encompassing a broader range of cultural disciplines. To its credit, the 2024–25 cultural year does seem to be pushing in that more expansive direction, with events happening, as mentioned, in 51 Chinese cities and 38 Russian cities. Still, concerns persist that greater mutual understanding is developing mainly among elites, with limited diffusion to the broader public.

Will this renewed effort at cultural diplomacy succeed in deepening the Russia-China relationship beyond elite orchestrations and state symbolism? The answer remains uncertain. Despite the surge in interest in Russia in the Chinese language, cars, nannies, books, exhibitions, and performances and “a growing mania for Chinese goods and culture across Russia” this is largely due to the isolation and sanctioning of Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, with little where else to go but China. Russian tourism in China, for example, has surged since the start of the war with Chinese tourism to Russia also growing significantly. 

While not yet reaching pre-COVID levels, close to 1.2 million Chinese citizens visited Russia in 2024. Yet the persistent structural barriers between the two societies, from linguistic isolation to cultural asymmetry and historical ambivalence, may limit the extent of this interest in China by Russians, especially when the war with Ukraine finally ends along with the likely lifting of some of the Western travel restrictions that Russian citizens currently face. As a Russian expert in Chinese language and culture recently noted, “Deep down nothing has changed,… .” China “is a foreign culture.”

On the other hand, a survey published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in January 2025 asked respondents how they viewed Russia. Among Chinese respondents, 39 percent identified Russia as an ally with shared values and interests, while 48 percent saw it as a “necessary partner” for strategic collaboration, both figures slightly higher than in a previous survey held between December 2022 and January 2023. Among Russians, 36 percent saw China as an ally, while 51 percent saw it as a necessary partner. The ECFR concluded that “Russians and Chinese are much more united in their mutual appreciation than Europeans and Americans. The perception of Russia in China has strengthened marginally since the end of 2022, but so has the perception of China in Russia. This makes this couple a rare ‘entente cordiale’ in today’s global politics.” Still, these numbers could just as plausibly reflect strategic pragmatism rather than genuine cultural or ideological affinity.

In the end, the rather ceremonial initiatives contained in the current “Years of Chinese and Russian Culture” may signal more about how both states wish to be perceived – by their own citizens and by the world – than about any profound convergence between their peoples. While cultural diplomacy is often cast as a tool for fostering mutual understanding and societal connection, in this case, it appears more instrumental, serving to legitimize a broader geopolitical alignment rather than to cultivate organic cultural intimacy. Culture, here, may be less a bridge than a diplomatic façade, masking, alongside external displays of a steadfast partnership, a fragile partnership marked by mutual wariness. Yet the cultural diplomacy efforts show that this dimension of the relationship cannot be ignored. Certainly, both countries clearly see culture as a vital tool in their foreign policy arsenal and one they are willing to deploy, and invest in, as a way of reinforcing bilateral ties.