Roland and I actually agree more than he lets on perhaps because I ran away with one of his webchat comments past what he had intended. I was more careless with my words than I should have been, but the point I was making is that the conventional military threat to Canada is pretty minimal. Roland is right to note that Canada must protect itself from less conventional threats, which leads him to the conclusion that the F-35 might not be the best choice and where one can infer that subs might not be that useful either. He is also right that Canada needs to do its part of securing North America.
Indeed, he has gotten to the conclusion in one post what I was/am seeking to do in a couple–define threats and then specify the capabilities that would be required.

Two related comments on Roland Paris’ excellent articulation of basic approaches to Canadian Defence Policy. First, while the “defence against help” rational for giving priority to continental defence still has relevance, it is much less salient now than it was during the Cold War. It really comes down to a basic security responsibility that applies to all sovereign states – namely, there is a primary responsibility to assure neighbors that one’s own territory is not available to third parties, either through neglect or collusion, to threaten the security of those neighbors. That obviously means it is essential to have a credible capacity to monitor and control one’s own territory, and, in Canada, that is overwhelmingly a matter of aid to the civil authority – e.g. supporting border patrols related to terrorism and contraband involves monitoring and patrolling air and sea approaches to Canadian territory, in addition there is support to fisheries patrols and so on. That is the second comment. Roland did mention aid to the civil authority, but I think it deserves rather more attention, including when it comes to procurement. Day-to-day air defence operations in Canada, for example, are prominently focused on monitoring East and West coast air traffic to identify unauthorized aircraft – most unauthorized flights being of small aircraft potentially linked to smuggling drugs and other contraband. There is certainly a need to assess and be responsive to other capital S Security threats, but are F-35s, or F-18s for that matter, the best way respond to Cessnas packed with narcotics?

Thanks to both of you for your comments. (It’s great to hear thoughtful, measured arguments, rather than the vitrol that so often pollutes “comments” sections of websites.) Ernie’s points are well taken. I might quibble about the comparison between Canada’s situation and that of other countries. We live beside the behemoth — and this particular behemoth has been hyper-sensitive to unconventional threats since 9/11. Through the American security lens, we occupy the immediate approach to the “homeland,” which is why Canada needs not only to ensure that our territory, airspace and waters don’t pose a threat to the US, but that we are *seen* to be monitoring and mitigating those threats at all times. We wouldn’t want to take this argument too far, of course. But if we want to talk about Canadian “grand strategy,” I’d argue that we really have only one genuinely vital or existential interest in our foreign policy: namely, keeping the US-Canada border reliably open to legitimate shipments and travelers. That, in turn, depends in part on continuing to convince US decisionmakers and “influencers” that we are effective partners in continental security.

Steve’s points are also well taken. Most importantly, we both think the analysis of CF capabilities needs to flow from a strategic assessment. Starting with an analysis of threats, as he suggests, is one way to approach this assessment. My own preference is to start with foreign policy priorities, but the principle is the same. I think we might also differ on whether the “home game” or the “away game” should be the priority mission for the CF. In my mind, there’s no question that Canadian and continental security comes first. In any event, Steve and I are going to have to work hard to find stuff to disagree about in this Roundtable blog. Stay tuned!

So glad to see a thoughtful discussion about the future of the Canadian military taking place. Beneath the debate about the costs of the F-35 is a more fundamental question about what role Canadian Forces will be playing in the future, and its good to see that issue being tackled. While I agree with most of what has been said, I would like to challenge the premise that we need to maintain a “multifunctional military” that is adaptable to many types of overseas missions.

As Roland pointed out, our world is becoming more multi-polar with and we can see developing powers playing a more active role in maintaining and shaping the international order. In this context it seems neither affordable nor necessary to maintain a Canadian Forces that can do a bit of everything. Pursuing that goal always seems to end in mediocrity. While it’s true that we can’t predict what the next war will look like, we can reasonably sure that we won’t be going into it alone. In fact, we probably don’t need to participate in every mission that comes along. It’s time to get more strategic.

As the international stage becomes more crowded, I think it’s time for the CF to focus on its comparative advantages vis-à-vis our allies. By strategically developing key strengths and abilities, the Canadian Forces could create a useful niche for itself and bring more value to international missions. For example, while almost every country has infantry to contribute, Canada is one of the few with the capacity to develop the strategic and tactical airlift ability to deploy and supply troops anywhere in the world. We saw the impact that ability had on the relief mission to Haiti.

On the other hand, even if Canada were to procure a full fleet of stealth fighters, it could still only make a symbolic contribution to missions like the one that destroyed Libya’s air defences. Maybe that’s not the most useful role for us to play.

If our goals are to build stronger relationships with emerging economies and encourage rising powers to play a constructive role in maintaining the international system, we should orient the Canadian Forces to support those goals. A military that could provide airlift and logistical support to the peacekeeping efforts of developing regional powers like Nigeria and Brazil would be a good place to start.

I think we’ll find that historically, Canadian defence policy has featured these three missions, usually (but not always) in this order – defence of Canada; defence of the continent in cooperation with the US; and contributing to international peace and security. Dr. Doug Bland characterized these priorities more colourfully when he said Canada has two strategic imperatives and one strategic choice. The imperatives are: defend Canada and defend the continent in cooperation with the US. The strategic choice is to do anything else we want to. I don’t see why these ‘priorities’ need to be refined any further. I think it might be getting too tactical when talk turns to more specific priorities like coastlines and sea approaches.

I suggest there is an unspoken element of defence policy that is rarely recognized, although it made a brief appearance in the 1994 White Paper on Defence, which said the CF was to retain a combat capability and be able to ‘fight alongside the best, against the best.’ As part of cementing our relationship with the US, we want to be seen to be interoperable with US forces and to match their professional standards – which the CF does, and then some. So, we want big, complex ships to be able to plug into US carrier groups. We want the F-35 to be able to integrate into a US air campaign. While we expect to be doing this abroad, the implicit understanding is that the US will help us here at home if we need it, and when they do, we have to be able to participate at the same level or we will lose control of operations in Canadian waters, territory or air space. Moreover, just being involved in the related complicated procurement projects has spinoff benefits for Canadian science, business and trade. It also keeps professional doctrine current. Perhaps striving to be a big-league player is not a bad thing.

Ultimately, whether ‘war’ or not, when the CF fights, the battle is not intended to be fair fight. Having the best available kit in the hands of the best troops is one way of increasing your chances of prevailing in the pursuit of strategic objectives. Why give the troops another Ross rifle, when a Lee Enfield is available?

On another tack, discussions of military capabilities in the arctic have perhaps lacked a bit of imagination. Until an ‘adversary’ penetrates our territory or air space, military responsbility lies primarily beyond our territorial waters – where a ‘blue-water’ navy, and good aircrart, are needed, particularly if we want to meet the adversary far away. If we are truly concerned about handling troublesome foreign vessels and aircraft in our waters and airspace, we might start to think about beefing up the RCMP and Coast Guard, who have primary responsibility for law enforcement within Canada. We should not misrepresent the lack of robust capability on the part of domestic organizations as a reason to build up the CF to do a job that might not be a true military mission (I could go on at length about how search and rescue should not be a military task – but that can be belted around another time).

Satellites, UAVs, helicopters, patrol aircraft all in a network might do the trick within our boundaries. Besides, any foreign ship that became a problem would have as difficult time in getting away, as our ships would have in getting to it. Ahhhh, where is a good nuclear submarine when you need one?

Finally, I wonder why we never discuss the role of the Territories vis-a-vis arctic security. They may not be able to do much about it now, but in the context of the vision for their future (provinces?), territorial law enforcment organizations (beyond the RCMP) might be worth a chat. I acknowledge the resource and human capacity problem today, but perhaps ideas about how to handle all this should be more future-oriented rather than falling back on the old idea of just ‘give the navy some more icebreakers and let’s get at it.’

Interesting reading, and I second some of the other comments below about how refreshing it is to see reasoned discussion rather than screaming and ranting in a website’s comments.

But I have to ask — what about the “Canada First Defence Strategy”? (or CFDS as the acronym loving military calls it). How can this discussion not have mentioned it?

Whatever you think of it (and there’s plenty of criticism of it — mostly that its less a serious and coherent “strategy” and more of a public relations pamphlet) it does in fact state (more-or-less) exactly what Dr Paris advocates. To be exact, the CFDS spells out three roles for the Canadian Forces as, the ability to operate in:
(1) Canada;
(2) North-America; and
(3) the rest of the world.
In that order of priority.

This is very prominently featured on the CF website (the first link offered up on the main page).
See for yourself: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/index-eng.asp?

That corresponds especially well to the three priorities Jim Cox advocates in his comment.

So, what is your folks take of the CFDS? That it advocates exactly what you’re suggesting here and provides a great roadmap forward for how to do that? That, actually, while it may appear to reflect what you are all advocating, in fact the CFDS does not reflect your views? That the CFDS offers similar views to what you’re advocating overall, but after that surface similarity it remains stuck at the level of platitudes and offers no real meat? Or what?

Interesting stuff….

The CFDS does indeed spell out the three roles, in priority and explains some of the concepts on which DND and CF activity are based. It also assigns missions (that are current and provide the basis of CF doctrine and training). Importantly, the CFDS makes the point that government wants industry on side with future equipment acquisitions. The document provides details of kit being procured. The main intent here is to offer some kind of stability (equipment type and funding) so that industry can ‘plan’ their participation. The hope was to avoid the ups and downs (mostly downs) of previous government funding levels, which tended to frustrate industry because they never knew if bidding was worth it or not.

The CFDS was published in 2008. The original version was expected in 2005. In fact, the Martin government had started on a strategic capital equipment procurement plan that was supposed to come out shortly after, and complement, the 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) volume on Defence. Remember that Rick Hillier was already CDS at the time and had started work on CF transformation and plan for new equipment (remember the ‘honkin’ big ship’?). Soon after, the government changed and Minister O’Connor had his own views on what major crown projects should be advanced, in what order. It took from 2005 to 2008 (and another Minister, and a couple of deputy ministers) to get the details ironed out in a politically acceptable manner.

Read the CFDS now (after Afghanistan) and the document remains generally sound. It is being used effectively by the CF as they adapt to a post-Afghanistan tempo of operations, budget cuts and imposed economies.

My own argument with the CFDS resides in the fact that I have not seen any defence policy from which this defence strategy is derived. The current government won’t admit that the 2005 IPS defence statement was a pretty good one. Moreover, they will certainly not admit that they have effectively (and quietly) followed that defence statement as a kind of ‘implicit’ defence policy.

In fact, come to think of it, I have not seen any other explicit policy – international, health, industry, trade, or whatever – published by this government. They seem to be doing a lot of things, but have apparently not taken the time to tell us why.

Ultimately the CFDS is better than nothing, but I still await a real defence policy that gives it context.

This is an interesting discussion. Jim Cox preempted my reaction to this debate: the direction of Roland and Steve’s thinking seems to me very in line with what was debated in 2005 around the International Policy Statement (one major element of which was the Hillier-drive Defence Strategy). The two roles outlined by Roland – continental defence and participation in multilateral missions – formed the core of that strategy too. Also nice to hear that many have to grudgingly admit that the 2005 IPS got some things right (full disclosure: I was one of the co-authors!)